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"It is not by the consolidation or concentration 
of powers, but by their distribution, that good gov­
ernment is effected. Were not this country already 
divided into states, that division must be made, 
that each might do for itself what concerns itself 
directly, and what it can so much better do than a 
distant authority. Each state again is divided into 
counties land municipalitiey, each to take care of 
what lies within its local bounds. . . . It is by 
this partition of cares, descending in gradation 
from general to particular, that the mass of human 
affairs may best be managed for the good and pros­
perity of all." 
- Thomas Jefferson 
A basic American tradition is that problems which are na-
tional in scope shall be handled by the national government, 
while problems of merely state-wide concern are left for state 
government. Municipal home rule is the application of this 
basic principal in the relationship of the state to its towns 
and cities. To put the matter in the most simple and direct 
terms - nothlng should be done at the national level that can 
be done efficiently by the states and nothing should be handled 
at the state level that can be dealt with effectively by the 
local community. It is by such sub-division of governmental 
power and responsibility that we in America have sought to solve 
"the inherent difficulty which Lblgnes� begets -- whether in the 
government of industry, university or nation -- namely, the task 
of getting things done, consistently with that large regard for 
individual variations which is the essence of demOcrary. ,,1 
Home rule does not merely free cities from irksome control 
of purely local affairs by outsiders. It also relieves the already 
overburdened state legislature from the time consuming and thank-
less task of serving as city council for hundreds of communities. 
whose special problems it cannot reasonably be expected to compre-
hend. In short, home rule is beneficial to both state and local 
government. It is, after all, only another aspect of that divi-
sion of labor which is the rule of modern life. 
But hile the principle of local self-government for towns and 
cities is clear, experience in some states has shown that it is some-
times difficult, to achieve in practice. To come at once to the heart 
of the matter -- in those states where home rule has failed, failure 
has resulted primarily from the attitude of the state courts. 2 
In some instances judges have displayed what can only be des-
cribed as hostility toward the idea of home rule. The result has 
been a gradual whittling away of municipal powers until little or 
nothing remains of local self-government.3 For such a situation 
there is, of course, no easy or immediate remedy. No form of con-
stitut10nal language can be devised to give what a hostile court 
·sees fit to withhold. 
Another stumbling block has been not so much a hostile atti-
tude, as an apparent lack of judicial enthusiasm, an attachment 
for the old, customary way of doing things. In fairness to the 
judges it should be added that this attitude often has been merely 
4 
a by-product of inadequate and orly drawn constitutional guides. 
For prob ems of this type there is, of course, a remedy consti-
t uti onal provisions that will supply the judiciary with something 
ore than p i ous wishes for their guidance. What follows is an 
effort to indicate some paths to this goal. Part I deals with the 
relatively simple matter of authorizing municipalities to adopt 
and amend their own charters. Part II deals with the far more 
difficult problem of the allocation of functions as between the 
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st ate and the mun i c i pa l i ty. The first c o n c e rns forms of go ve rn­
ment; t he se c o nd the powers of go vernment. P ar t  III de als with 
the r e l ate d p r o b lem of the e x t ensi on of c i t y b o undar i e s  by the 
an nexat i o n of fr inge are as. 
PART 10 THE ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF MUNICIPAL CHARTERS 
A pr imary e l e ment of home r u le is the pro visi on for adopt ion 
or ame n dme nt by e a c h  indi vidual m u n i c i p ali ty of i ts own c i ty 
.c har t e r. As a mat ter of expe r i e n c e, this aspe c t  of home r u l e  
has n o t  be e n  t h e  sourc e  o f  any gre at diffi c u lty. The c hief pro b­
l em here is to de vise a simp le and workab l e  pro c e dure for as cer­
t ain i ng the wishes of the c omm un i t y w ith respec t to its basic 
governme n t al org an i zation and mac hinery . In some c ases the state 
c onstitut i o n itself provides these pro cedures; in o t he rs the c o n­
stit u t i o n mer ely provides that the sta te legisla t ure sha ll by 
general l aw supply them. The former may be made "self-exec uting" 
in order to free home rule from possible fr ustration by a dilatory 
or unfrien dly state legislature. On the other hand leaving the 
mat t e r  t o  the le gislatures may provide greater flexibility in the 
face of expe rien ce and c hangin g conditions. As Rodney Mott has 
said, "in its zeal t o  insure loc al a utonomy, regardless of the 
a t tit ude of the legislature t ow ard it, a state may set up suc h  a 
c umb e rsome p r o c edure . . . as t o  pre clude its a c t u al use . If the 
de t a i ls of c har t e r-making �r e t o o  c omp l e x, the c i t ize ns may be 
discouraged from undertaking it. Even if they are cour ageous 
e n o ugh t o  make t he at t emp t, t he c o ur ts may d e c l are t he n ew 
Lchar t e r  or ame ndme n!l i l leg a l  beca use of a fail ure t o  c o nf orm 
to some o bsc ure t e c hnic al p oint . A pr escrip t i o n  of the de t ails of 
c h ar t e r - making may p l ac e  a c ity on a pro c edur al tight r ope . The 
c it i es n e e d  a pr ac t i c al home r u l e  pr o c edure r a t he r  than a t he o ­
r e tica l righ t whi c h  it may be diffi c ult t o  use .,15 
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In view of these considerations it would seem desirable to 
require the state legislature by general law to provide charter-
making and amending procedures and also to provide an alternative, 
self-executing procedure in the constitution itself. The latter 
should be in broad outline form as in the constitutions of Colorado 
( Constitution, Art. XX, Sec. 5) and Texas ( Constitution, Art. XI, 
Sec. 5). For "the fewer details which can be included and still 
enable the cities to proceed regardless of legislative inaction, 
the better. . . . It is more in accordance with the spirit of 
home rule to permit a city to work out its own procedure through 
the local council or charter commission than to prescribe it by 
constitutional or legislative fiat.,,
6 
The following proposed constitutional provisions have been 
prepared in the light of these considerations: 
Section 1: Provision shall be made by general law for 
the incorporation of counties, municipalities and other 
civil divisions; and for the alteration of boundaries and · . / 
the consolidation in whole or in part of neighboring e �/VI 
divisions and for the dissolution thereof. 
Provision shall also be made by general law, which may 
provide optional plans, for the organization and govern­
ment of counties, municipalities and other civil divisions 
whiqh do not secure locally framed and adopted charters in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of this Article. 
But no charter of organization and government shall become 
ope ve in any � ;t�� until submitted to the quali-
fied voters thereof in accordance with the election pro-
cedures outlined in Section 2 of this Article and approved 
by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon. 
Section 2: Subject only to the Declaration of Rights of 
this Consti tution, the provisions of this .Article 7 and gen­
eral laws of the state which ido not deal with matters of 
purely or essentially local concern and whicb7 in terms and 
effect apply alike to all municipalities, any municipality 
may adopt or amend a charter for its own organization and 
government in the following manner: upon resolution approved 
by a majority of the members of the legislative body of the 
municipality or upon petition of ten per cent of the quali­
fied voters of the municipality proposing the adoption or 
amendment of a charter, said legislative body shall give 
public notice of the proposed charter or amendment, andnot 
less than one month nor more than six months after such 
publication shall submit the proposed charter or amendments 
to the qualified voters of the municipality at a special or 
general election. Any number of amendments may be submitted 
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for approval or disapproval at any election, but each amend­
ment shall be voted upon separately. Sub ject to the other 
provisions of this Article, proposals submitted in reason­
able conformity with the procedures herein outlined shall be 
immediately effective upon approval by a majority of the 
qualified voters voting thereon. 
Section 3: Municipalities are hereby authorized to appro­
priate money and to make rules and regulations for the con­
duct of elections authorized by Sections I and 2 of this 
Article. 
PART 110 THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS BETWEEN STATE AND MUNICIPALITY 
In those states in which home rule has failed, the stumbling 
block has always been the difficulty of locating a line between 
local and state affairs. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
with disarming frankness has confessed that "We find no answer 
to thisLproble�in any decision of any court in this country. "8 
In some cases the language of home rule provisions has been am­
biguous. 9 Often the difficulty has sprung from the inability of 
human foresight and language to anticipate the problems that time 
and change present. Sometimes judges have been hostile, sometimes 
merely unfriendly. All too frequentlyfuey have been compelled to 
make decisions withwt the aid of adequate legislative or consti-
tutional gUideposts. To make matters worse we often want both 
local autonomy and the uniformity or improved standards which in 
practice come most easily from central supervision.IO Finally 
there are those among us whose enthusiasm switches back and forth 
between local and state autonomy according to their selfish inter-
ests or prejudices in each particular case. 
A. The Concurrent Power Approach 
To state the problem in the thoroughly orthodox manner in which 
it has just been stated assumes that there is a sharp line of demar-
cation between state and local affairs and that the difficulty lies 
in locating it. But experience teaches that categories distinct at 
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t he i r  c ores merge in to on� an o t her at the i r  p e r i p he r i es. An d 
mat ters that are pure l y  l o c a l f or some purposes are of st a t e - w i de 
c o n c e rn for o t h e r  purp oses. Moreove r ,  what c o n c e rns on ly t owns 
and c i ties t o d ay may we l l  ha ve b r o ader imp l i c ations t o morr ow. For 
ex ample , as the Sup reme C o ur t of C a l i f o rn i a  has ob ser ved , 
Un t i l  the ad ve n t  of the au t o m obi le , interurb an t r affi c 
was so sm al l as t o  be ne g l i g i b l e , an d ,  as a resu l t , traff i c  
re gul at ions were a ma t ter of c o n cern on ly t o  t he inhab i t an ts 
of the city. Bu t when au t os an d mo t o r t r u c ks i n vad e d  our 
h i ghw ays an d stree ts in t e ns an d hun dreds of t hous an ds , a 
m a t ter that ye s t e r d ay w as l o c a l has b e c ome of s t a t e  an d n a t i on-
w i d e  imp o r t an c e  t o day. . The t e rm lImun i c i p a l  af fairs" is 
n o t  a fixe d quan t i ty but f l uc tu a t es w i t h e very c hange i n  the 
c o n d i tions up on whi c h  it i s  t o  oper a t e. l l  
Judg e Marshal l o f  M iss ouri put the p r o b lem in a nutshe l l  when he 
dec l ared "i t is ex treme ly un f o r tun ate t h a t  this c our t ever at temp t e d  
to so l ve t h e  p r o b lem b y  dr aw i ng a dis t in c t i o n b e tween m at t e rs o f  mere 
l o c a l  c o n c e r n  an d mat t e rs of state c o n c e r n  . .  No fixed, certain, 
general or intelligible rule can be formulated upon such a distinc-
tion . .  Lfo£! there are many matters which are in a sense local 
but in which the state at large has a direct interest.,,12 In short, 
if the orthodox demarcation approach is used, the problem is essen-
tially ins olvable -- for it as sumes conditions that do not exist. 
The resul t is "built in" uncertainty, controvers y and litigation. 
The solution then is to cut the gordian knot -- to recognize, for 
example, that the public school s ystem is in some of its aspects and 
in some c on t ex t s  both local and s uper-local. This entails (1) making 
the p owers of t he s t a t e  an d city concurrent, (2) outlawing all 
special legislation in the m u n ic ipal field , and (3) recognizing that 
in case of c o nflict gener al s t a t e  l egisl ation sh al l t ake prec e den c e  
o ve r  l o c al c har t e rs an d ordinances . Item (1) fac es r e a l ity by 
re c ognizing tha t there is n o  sharp demar c at i o n l i ne betw e e n  c i ty an d 
s t a t e  affairs and thus e l imin a t e s  t he b asi c c ause of home rul e f a i l -
ures . I t e m  (2) t akes ac c oun t of t he h is t or i c a l f a c t t h a t  it is 
sp e c ial le gis l a t i o n that h as b e e n  the curse of muni c i p a l  g o ve r nme n t . 
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All to o often such legi slation in fact i s  not legi slation by the 
state legislature. It i s  in practice s imply the dictate of one 
or a handful of legi slators from a particular city_ As such, of 
course, it circumvents the inherent, democratic safeguard against 
unwi se legi slati on. Finally, item (3) recognizes the hi storical 
fact that general legi slati on has not been a serious danger to 
legitimate city interests; that the requirement of generality 
provides inherent safeguards against legi slative abuses; and 
that inevitably in case of real difference of opini on between 
state and city on any specific matter the former must and will 
prevail under any system. Home rule does not mean anarchy. It 
recognizes that in matters affecting the general welfare of the 
13 
state, the state must prevail. In case of di sagreement as to 
what i s  local and what i s  of state-wide importance, certainly a 
local view must give way when mo st citizens of the state, acting 
through their respons ible representatives at the state capitol, 
are in agreement upon the need for uniform state acti on. To hold 
otherwi se i s  to deny the bas ic democratic premi se that in commu-
nity affairs the views of the many shall prevail over the views 
of the few. 
The following propo sed constituti onal provi s i ons are offered 
as embodying the foregoing princiPles:14 
Secti on 4: Subject only to the Declaration of Rights, 
the provi s i ons of thi s  Articlel5 and general laws of the 
state which ida not deal with matters of purely or essen­
tially local concern and whicb! in terms and effect apply 
alike to all municipalities, each municipality shall have 
full power to tax, regulate and otherwi se govern within its 
territorial jurisdicti on; and both within and beyond its 
territorial juri sdicti on to borrow money and acquire real 
or pers onal property by condemnati on or otherwi se for com­
munity welfare purpo ses, and to di spo se thereof. 
For purpo ses of zoning and other regulati ons of land use 
the term "territorial juri sdicti on" as used in thi s  secti on 
includes all areas within five miles beyond each municipality's 
corporate limits in the case of municipalities of less than 
25,000 inhabitants, and ten miles in the case of larger mu­
nicipalities, excepting any area within the corporate limits 
of another municipality. Where there is not enough di stance 
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between two municipalities to give each the full zoning 
area to which it would otherwise be entitled, the zoning 
power of each shall extend to a point midway between the 
two. 
Secti on 5: Any municipal charter, ordinance or regu­
lation adopted pursuant to the terms of th is  Article shall 
supersede any conflicting special legi slati on of the state. 
The state shall not hereafter enact any special legi slation 
with respect to any municipality or any matter within the 
territorial juri sdicti on of any munici.pal1ty Lnor any legi s­
lation whats oever dealing with matters of purely or es sen­
tially local concern� 
Secti on 6: No state legi slati on /deali.ng with municipal 
salaries and wageE! that would directly and substantially 
increase the fi scal burdens of any municipality shall be­
come effective in such municipality until approved by the 
legi slative body thereof. But nothing in thi s Article 
shall be deemed to restrict the power of the state to give 
fiscal aid to municipalities for the purpose of improving 
their facilities or services. 
The geographical restricti on that Section 4 imposes on the 
governmental power of cities i s  nothing more than the territorial 
limitati on that applies to all governments. In short except for 
zoning purpo ses the concurrent power of the city under thi s  pro-
vi s i on runs only to the city limits, just as nati onal competence 
runs only to the nation's boundaries. The zoning power has been 
extended further to enable cities to protect themselves from 
strangulation by conditi ons over which they would otherwi se have 
no control short of annexation. It would ease municipal growing 
pains by providing the foundati on for orderly, planned growth. 
Too  many of our cities are now paying an unconscionable price for 
having in the past "just growed." 
But, it will be noted, Secti on 4 puts welfare rather than 
territorial limitations upon a city's proprietary powers, because, 
for example, citie s often need outside property for such things 
as water and sewage systems. Thi s, of course, means that under 
Section 4 municipal proprietary power would be subject to a 
qualitative limitation ( "community welfare" ) . Thi s i s  in effect 
a return� the old demarcation approach. Clearly such a limitation 
is much les s  objective than the territorial type and thus more 
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susceptible to judicial "manipulation'" or misunderstanding. But, 
if cities are to have at least some authority outside of their 
boundaries, thi s  seems to be the o st effective way to provide 
for it. 
Section 4 impo ses two limitations upon the power of the state 
to enact general legi slation. The first, conf ining general legi s-
lation to matters of more than IIpupely or es sential1y local con-
cern" is opti onal and would not appear in a strictly concurrent 
power system. But it might be included to throw weight on the 
side of municipal freedom. Such a limitati on, of course, would 
invite judicial interpretation, but only in case of attacks upon 
state laws deemed unduly to_impinge upon local affairs and not 
vice versa. For the territorial restriction is the only corre­
sponding limit on city governmental powers.16 
The second re straint on the general legislative powers of 
the state impo ses the requirement that laws must "in terms and 
effect apply alike to all municipalities." This clause comes 
from the New York Constituti onl7 and has been construed by Chief 
Judge Cardoza in a leading case18 to mean that classification of 
cities for legislative purposes is permi ssible, but only if it 
is not in fact a subterfuge for special legislati on� 
We are no longer confined to the inquiry whether an act is 
general or local "in i.ts terms." We must go farther and 
inquire whether it is genera�. or local "in its effec t". . . . 
If the clas s in its formati on i s  so unnatural and wayword 
that only by the rarest coincidence can the range of its 
extension include more than one locality, and at best but 
two or three, the act s o  hedged and circumscribed is local 
Lie. special! in effect. If the same limits are apparent 
upon the face of the act, unaided by extrinsic evidence, or 
are so no torious or obvious as to be the sub ject of judicial 
notice, it is also local .!...ie. not general! in its terms. 
The statute now bef ore us canno t survive these tests. All 
the stigmata of arbitrary selection, of f orced and unnatural 
clas sif icati on, appear upon its face. By its terms a new 
burden has been laid, despi�e its pretense of generality, 
but upon one city or a fewo�9 
These limited quotations hardly do Chief Judge- Cardoza justice, 
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but a full reading of the opinion and a subBequent case20 based 
thereon makes it quite clear that under the clause in question 
special legislation disguised by classi.fication is outlawedo21 
The Section 5 restriction upon all legislation, general or 
special, "of purely or essentially local concern" is optional, 
being merely a negative counterpart of the Sffine restraint that 
appears in Section 4. 
The "fiscal burden" restriction in Section 6 is designed to 
put a check upon state legislators who ( often at the instance of 
pressure groups ) find it easy to vote "improvements" which not 
they, but city councils, will have to find a way to finance. 
This restriction, of course, would not imperil state financed 
improvements. It would mean simply that, if the state legislature 
wanted to require higher standards then municipalities saw fit to 
provide, the state would have to pay for them either wholly or by 
a grant-in-aid system. 
But such a provision entails a serious danger. It might 
encourage cities to hold back needed improvements in the hope that 
the state would thus be compelled to provide them. We certainly 
should not encourage local communities to lag behind the times. 
Indeed it is precisely their failure to keep up with modern 
developments that has brought about a good part of the present 
state "interence" in local affairsa 
B. The Model State Constitution Approach 
Eor those who prefer the demarcation line ap proach, the 
Model State Constit ution of the National Municipal League provides 
an excellent Solution�22 Drawing upon experience in all. home rule 
states over a long period of years, the League has devised the 
following composite of what it considers the most desirable fea­
tures of a number of different state constitutions: 
- 10 -, 
" . . 
Section 4: Each municipality is hereby granted full 
power and authority to pass laws and ordinances relating 
to its local affairs, property and government; and n o  
enumeration of powers i n  this constitution shall be 
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority 
hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall n ot be 
deemed to limit or restrict the po er of the legislature 
to enact laws of state-wide c oncern uniformly applicable 
to every municipality. 
The followi ng shall be deemed to be a part of the powers 
conferred upon municipali ti.es by tl'"tl.s Section when n ot in­
consistent with general law� 
(a) To adopt and enforce within thei� limits local 
police, sanitary and other s,imilar regulations .. 
(b) To levy, assess and collect taxes, and to borr ow 
money and issue bonds, and to levy and collect special 
assessments for benefits c onferredu 
(c) To furnish all local public services; and to 
acquire and maintain, either within or without its cor­
porate limits, cemeteries, h ospitals, infirmaries, parks, 
and boulevards, water supplies, and all works which in­
volve the public health and safety. 
(d) T o  maintain art institutes, museums, theatres, 
operas, or orchestras, and to make any other pr ovis1.on 
for the cultural needs of the residents� 
(e) To establish and alter the location of streets, to 
make local public impr ovements, and to acquire, by condem­
nati on or otherwise, pr operty within its c orp orate limits 
necessary for such improvements, and a1so to acquire 
additional property in order to preserve and protect such 
impr ovements, and to lease or sell such additional pr operty, 
with restrictions to preserve and pr otect the improvements. 
(f) To acquire, construct, hire, maintain and operate 
or lease local public utilities; to acquire, by condemnation 
or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, pr op­
erty necessary for any such purposes, subject to restric­
tions imposed by general law for the pr otection of other 
c ommunities; and to grant local public utility franchises 
and regulate the exercise thereof. 
(g) To issue and sell bonds, outside of any general 
debt limit imp osed by law, on the security in whole or in 
part of any public utility or property owned by the city, 
or of the revenues thereof, or of both, including in the 
case of a public utility, if deemed desirable by the city, 
a franchise stating the terms upon which» in case of fore­
closure, the purchaser may operate such util1.tyo 
(h) To organize and administer public sch ools and 
libraries. 
(i) To pr ovide for slu� clearance, the rehabilitati on 
of blighted areas, and safe and sanitary housing � or 
families of low incollieJ and for recreational and other 
facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto; and gifts 
of money or pr operty, or loans of money or credit for such 
purposes, shall be deemed to be for a city purpose� 
It will be noted that this proposal begins with a division 
of power predicated on a distinction between '�local affairs, 
pr operty and g overnment" and affaire, "of state-lf.iide concern. II 
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Then, as Arthur Bromage observes, it faces the problem of 
pos sible unfriendly judicial interpretation "by specifically 
enumerating large segments of municipal authority . .  
Further definition of municipal authority over local affairs, 
property and government depends, of course, on the legislature 
and the courts. In this way LSection ±I avoids the broad grant 
without any enumeration and also avoids constitutional language 
leaving the determination of municipal powers entirely to the 
vagaries of legislative action. 
"When all is said and done, it must be recognized that the 
ultimate succes s of the home rule section of the Model State 
Constitution, like many of the home rUle articles now in ex-
istence among the states, rests upon a wiser and broader sweep 
24 of judicial interpretation. " If Mr. Bromage is right in sug-
gesting that judicial interpretation is home rule's greatest 
danger, then clearly there is more risk involved in the model 
than in the concurrent power proposal. For, in addition to the 
dangers which Mr. Bromage admits, the special enumeration of local 
powers in sub- sections (a) to (i) itself presents problems of, or 
at least is susceptible to unfriendly, interpretation. The purely 
concurrent power approach undertakes to remove allocation entirely 
from judicial hands. But it would leave to the courts the prob-
lem of enforcing the constitutional prohibition upon special 
legislation with respect to cities and upon attempts at evasion 
via specious clas sification. And, of course, if the optional 
re straints upon state powers are used, the courts would have 
something to say about the scope of state power -- thus giving 
home rule a second line of defense. 
It should be noted that the Model Constitution adopts the 
Wisconsin Constitution's treatment of the clas sification problem 
- home rule powers with respect to local matters "shall not be 
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deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature to 
enact laws of state-wide concern uniformly applicable to every 
municipality.fI This has been held by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court to mean that� 
If in dealing with the local affairs of a city the Legis­
lature clas sifies so that the act does not apply with 
uniformity to every city, that act is subordinate to a 
charter ordinance relating to the same matter" . . .  
When the Legislature deals with matters which are pri­
marily matters of state-wide concern, it may deal with 
them free from any restriction contained in the home rule 
amendment. . . . The power of the Legi slature to clas sify 
cities when it deals with local a 'fairs is impaired by the 
amendment� Its powers to c].as�ify cities when it deals 
wi th matteI'S of state-wide concern which. are not also local 
affairs is unimpaired.25 
C. The Leave-it-to-the-Courts Approach 
As indicated ab ove the consensus of informed opinion is that 
judicial efforts to determine the boundary between state and local 
a.ffairs has not in practice been conducive to effective home rule. 
Still there are s ome who, all things considered, may prefer the 
judicial to the political proces ses for the solution of such prob-
lems. This attitude is the more appealing b�cause it leaves final 
decision to the typically most conservative branch of the state 
government and the branch least likely to be encumbered with Itpoli-
tics.1f Certainlys passing thorny political bucks to the judiciary 
for sJlution is a deeply ingrained tradition in this country. In-
deed, this is exactly what has been done, consciously or uncon� 
sciously, in those home rule constitutions which purport to 
a.llocate powers between state and city by the use of ambiguous 
phrases which in the nature of things can have no intrinsic mean-
ing. To authorize municipalities, for example, to regulate all 
"local, " or "rnunicipa.ltl affairs 1s in effect to delegate policy 
making power to the courts - to give them a form of administra-
tive power to decide issues vlhich for one reason or another the 
constitut"onal convention itself found it inexpedient to decide. 
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Tho se who cons ider such "judicial home rule " desirable might 
bt · lo.t b t . t .. , . . . "-h f 11 . t 26 0 , aln y a cons 1 U�lOna.1. proVISIon In L- e . 0 .oWIng erms � . 
Secti on 4· Each municipalIty i s  hereby granted full 
power and authority to regulate its own local affairs 
subject only to the provi s i ons of thi s  Constitution and 
the general Land specia.V laws of the state" 
But as experience and Mr. McGoldrick .h.ave shownj "our judges 
are no better qualified to establi sh the rules of the relati on-
ship of municipalities to the state than are our legi slators, 
unles s we deem them men of greater sense and exper ience. Thi s  
must be quite apart from their legal training pe� ��, which would, 
if anything, unfit them for the task. Secondly, the judicial 
proces s has rather les s  to commend it for the s olution of munic-
ipal problems than the legislative proces s. The former is deeply 
concerned with precedent and overly interested in analysis. The 
latter admits of practical discussion by laymen conversant with 
the problem and i s  free to cons ider the widest possible implications 
of the policy to be decided upon. The judicial process i s  not only 
cumbers ome, co stly and slow, but it produces a scant product. Leg-
i slation permits a more complete and thorough job and permits 
matters to be considered in relation to a co ordinated programme 0 
Lastly, the judicial decis ion is  all but riveted into the consti-
tution which it interprets. Judicial mis-steps are not easy to 
retrace. They are apt to lead to further wander ing before they 
return to the path of wisdom� Legislative errors are far more 
readily retrieved. ,,27 Moreover, "jludlcial home rule " may be and 
has been unsati s f actor y from the courts' point of view. For it 
has a tendency to involve them in political controversies and 
thus weaken their effectiveness in more clearly judicial work. 
D. The AdoEted System Approach 
A well-known and generally recognized canon of construction 
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is that 
When provisions have been adopted into the consti� 
tution of the state, which are identical with or 
similar to those of other states, it will be presumed 
that the framers of such constitution were conversant 
with, and designed to adopt also, any construction 
previously placed on such provisions in such other 
states.28 
This means that by adopting the constitutional provisions under 
which home rule has flourished in another state, the adopting 
state in effect -- if the contrary is not indicated -- adopts 
also the other statevs past judicial interpretations of those 
provisions. The problem then is reduced to one of drawing in 
full measure upon the constitutional language of a state whose 
experience is deemed satisfactory. Tastes vary and there are 
about a score of different home rule systems to choose from, plus 
hundreds of interpretative court decisionso We will not here 
attempt the detailed analysis that would be required to make an 
intelligent choice as between the existing systems. But it will 
be appropriate to mention some of the problems which the adoption 
approach presents. 
Assuming, as we reasonably may, that the courts of the adopt-
ing state will honor the above mentioned canon of construction, 
it is possible that in some cases they will find that conditions 
in their state are sufficiently "different" to justify ignoring 
the outside precedents. Also it is just possible that upon some 
issues there will be no outside interpretative dec:is1ons to draw 
upon. Probably these difficulties are not in themselves suffi-
ciently serious to be considered as substantial objectlonso In 
any case, they may be anticipated and circumvented by appropriate 
constitutional language after careful examination of the relevant 
decisions before adopting any particular home rule scheme from a 
sister state. 
But a serious objection to the adoption approach is that 
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laymen, i. e. the voting public, cannot reasonably be -expected to 
know and understand a multitude of court decisions of the state 
whose system they are asked to adopt. Thus, in ef:ectJ they will 
have to vote their approval or disapproval in the dark, or on the 
basis of some onels interpretation of the relev\nt judicial inter-
pretations. This is hardly consonant with the ideals of democracy. 
E. The Illinois Plan 
The extremely difficult relationship between the metropolis 
of Chicago and the state of Illinois has resulted in a provision 
that no special state law with respect to Chicago can become 
effective until approved at the polls by the voters of that city. 
Such a negative approach certainly is not genuine home rule, but 
it does help to eliminate some of the abuses of the old system" 
This device could be expanded for more general use in other situ-
ations as indeed it was for a time in Michigan and New York before 
they obtained real local self- government. 29 
Under an expanded Illinois plan the state would retain its 
customary power to enact general and special legislation concern-
ing municipalities but no special law would go into effect until 
it had been approved by the voters (or the city council) of the 
community involved. This device might be used alone or in con-
junction with more orthodox, positive home rule provisions. 
Negativehome rule of this type might be obtained through a 
constitutional provision in the following terms: 
No special law, enactment or provision of this st ate 
shall become effecti "i.Te �Ni th respec t to any r .. unicipali ty 
or any matter of municipal interest unless approved by 
resolution of the legislative body of the municipality 
concerned, but nothing herein shall be deemed to limit 
the power of the legislature to enact general laws uni­
formly applicable to all municipalities. 
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Part III. Annexation of Fringe Areas 
ne oP the most troublesome municipaJ. problems is the 
growth of '�ringe areas around city territorial boundaries. 
For the practical purposes of everyday life such fringes are 
a part of the mother c ity · s economic and social existence, but 
they are beyond her re�u]atory and taxin� jurisdiction. Thus, 
the outsiders are able to enjoy the benefits of me tropoli tan 
life and avoid mOAt of its burdens. Conversely, city residents 
are n ormall y  compelled to pay county taxes that inure primarily 
for the benefit of ringe dwellers. 
To aggr ava t e matters the mother cit y  finds itself surrounded 
by sJums over which it has no con tro l and by wealthy suburban 
sec tions which it cannot tax. For it is often the more prosper-
ous who take their families to the out skirt s where they " e s c ape 
their rightful share of the burden of government in the central 
ci ty where they ork and ake their living� and in so doing in-
crease the governmental services and the resulting tax burden of 
those who remain. If the metropolitan region were treated as a 
un it, the burden would be eq�alized. The need is for an inte-
gration of the financial resources of the en tire region so that 
essential governmental services may be devel oped adequately 
throughout the areao1l30 
The latter indeed iB the he art of the matter. Wa.ter supplYJ 
sewage disposal, fire and police protection� cons truction and 
ma.intenance of roads a .. d h.ighways J and public welfare i.lIJork f'o� 
what is in re a l i  ty a single .. etrop o 1 1  tan community cannot ade-· 
quately and efficiently be provided by a ho s t of jealous, com-
peting and territorialJ.y 1irrj.ted jurisdictions. 
Few municipalities can real. y plan and exec ute proper 
systems for any of the s e purpcses3 and as the attempt is 
made, particularly in the met ropo lit an areas, munic ipal 
neighbors are encountered on alJ. sides who are engaged, 
.... 7 -
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at gre at expens e p in tryi ng to do th e s ame thing s � 
N atura l " y the e i s  a duplication of faci l itie s ,  waste 
o f  f �n d s  dnd efforts , wh en a given territory and a 
g i ve n  populati on in that territory are t o  be suppl i ed 
with vari ous servic e s  by a number of small, c ompeting , 
inade quate j urisdicti ons u Naturall y ,  al s o fue aggregate 
o f  the s e smal : plans will se ldom be as sati sfactory in 
de s ig n  or execution as would be a more c omprehe n s i ve 
plan f o r the larger gro up. 3 1 
P r o b l e � s  o f  th is type are s o  wide spre ad that f or t y - tw o  state s 
have ge n e r a l  legislation pro Jiding annexation procedures f o r the 
exten s i on of m un i c i p al boundarie s . I r the re�aining s ix state s 
the matter i s hand led by special l e g i s l a t i on � 3 2 But it is  a 
n o t or i o u s  f a c t that in practice an nexati on has not worked -- f or 
obvious re as ons o Mo s t  legi slation require s that municipal bound-
arie s s h a l l  not be exten ded wi thout the con s ent o f  at least a 
ma jority of the vo t e r s  or property owners o f  the area t o  be an-
ne v p j _ 33 An d , o f  c c u r s e , fri nge dwe llers , i f  o nly for tax 
re a s o n s , are not incl ine d to be ab s orbed. 
Spe c ial con sti t uti o . . .  al pr'ovi s i on s apart , howe ver ,  state s do 
have th e p ;we r to pro v i d e for compuls ory annexation and this 
p owe r may be lodged in the han d s  o f  muni c ipal itie s n 34 An obvious  
s o l ution ,  then , f or the problem of fringe areas would be a c on-
s t it ut ional provi s i on or general legi s lati on ) in the fo llowing 
terms :� 
Each unicipal ity may by adopting a new charter , or by 
amending its �xi sting charter annex an y ne ighb oring areas , 
pr ovided  that a smaller municipality s h al l n o t  annex a l l 
or any part of a larger municipal ity,  and pro vide d further 
that a l arger municipality shall not annex le s s  than the 
wh o l e  territory of a smal ler municipal ity and upon annex­
a t I o n o f  a s aller lln � .: . p a  i t y  shall be  re spon s .ible  for 
the de bts  there of. The terms " small er " and. " large r "  as 
u s e d  i n  th i s se ct i on refer to p op u l a t i on and n o t  to  g e o ­
gr aph i c al area . 
It n i l l be noted that th i s propos al contempl ate s that each 
indiv:dual bo undary exten s i on wo u ld ha ve t o  be author ized by a 
c hang e in the c i t y charter. This re quire s approval by the c ity 1 s  
qual ified voters ( s e e propo sed Se ction I ,  above ) . I f  thi s be 
- � b -
d e �me d t o o  c umbe r s ome ,  annex a t i on by o r d i n ary o r d i n an c e  p r o c e d ur e  
c o u l d  b e  S Ub s t i t u t e d . 35 
The f i r s t of the t w o  p r o vi s o s  i n  t he ame n dmen t a s  p r op o s e d  
i s  de s ign e d t o  f or e s t a l l any p o s s i b l e  at t e mp t  b y  a s at e l l i t e t own 
to w ar d  off anne x a t i on b y  c o un t e r - an n e x at i o n n ui s an c e  t a c t i c s .  
T he s e c an p r o v i s o  i s  c a l c u l at e d  t o  p r e ven t t he m o t he r  c i t y  
f r om m u t i l a. t l ng g o i ng c oram u n i  t i e s  by c u t t in g  o f f  the i r  m o r e  
de s i r a.b l e p ar t s an d l e t t i ng t h e  b a l an c e  s hi f t  f or t hem s e l ve s u 
I t  i s  a l s o  i mp o r an t that t he r e q u i re men t o f  t o t al ann e x at i on 
o b vi a t e s the o the rw i s e vex i ng n e c e s s i ty o f  p r o - r at i ng the s a t e l -
J i t e  s de b t s � 
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